1.2.4. Platform config (uefiplat.cfg)¶
The top-level FREEFORM file inside the embedded UEFI FV (Embedded UEFI firmware volume) is
the human-readable platform config XBL’s DXE phase consumes — the same blob
that carries DefaultBDSBootApp = "LinuxLoader" and the reserved-memory
map documented in XBL → ABL hand-off contract (bounded), plus flags such as EnableQseeLogsFlag
and SecBootEnableFlag (a config flag, not the fuse — decoded below)
and the ## PIL configuration base/size entries used by the peripheral
image loader.
1.2.4.1. The security flag is a single composite byte¶
The live line is SecurityFlag = 0xC4; the # …Flag = 0x… lines
beneath it are only a bit-legend the parser ignores (they are commented
out). 0xC4 decodes as LoadKeymasterFlag (0x80) | LoadSecAppFlag
(0x40) | CommonMbnLoadFlag (0x04):
Bit |
Mask |
State in |
Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
clear |
XBL’s own secure-boot config bit is not asserted |
|
|
clear |
measured-boot / TPM event log off |
|
|
set |
load the common-MBN image set |
|
|
clear |
HDCP2 app not loaded |
|
|
clear |
— |
|
|
clear |
Windows SecApp not loaded (Android target) |
|
|
set |
load |
|
|
set |
load |
So the SecBootEnableFlag config bit is clear on this unit. This is
XBL’s config-plane switch, distinct from the QFPROM SEC_BOOT hardware
fuse (which is read at runtime, not stored in any partition —
Secure boot and image signing, Open questions and limits of analysis); it corroborates the
test-key / not-enforced posture from the config side. Companion boot
constants in the same block: EnableShell = 0x1 (UEFI shell reachable in
BDS), SharedIMEMBaseAddr = 0x146AA000, DloadCookieAddr = 0x01FD3000
/ DloadCookieValue = 0x10 (the download-mode cookie XBL sets —
EDL / 9008 entry and the deep-flash cable), NumCpusFuseAddr = 0x5C04C (the CPU-count fuse XBL
reads for MPPark) and PwrBtnShutdownFlag = 0x0.
- Source:
_READONLY/lun1/xbl_a.bin, decompressed embedded UEFI FV (Embedded UEFI firmware volume).- Cross-refs:
XBL, Embedded UEFI firmware volume, XBL → ABL hand-off contract (bounded), Secure boot and image signing, EDL / 9008 entry and the deep-flash cable, Open questions and limits of analysis.